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Social Services and the Market*
Susan Rose-Ackerman**
Organizations that provide subsidized services to needy people are fre-
quently discouraged from competing with one another. Many policymakers
view the duplication of the competitive market place as wasteful, and stress
coordination, not competition.' They claim that quality can be controlled by
direct regulation and by the participation of needy clients in suppliers' deci-
sions. Many of these attempts to improve quality have, however, been fail-
ures. Direct regulation has proven expensive and has often been ineffective.
2
Attempts to raise the quality of services through client participation on boards
of directors and advisory groups have often floundered on the indifference
and inaction of client representatives.
3
In response to these difficulties some commentators have looked to eco-
nomic analysis for help in obtaining high-quality social services. Isolating
providers from the market, these commentators claim, will not eliminate
unnecessary duplication, but will instead lead to low quality, wasteful opera-
tions.4 Various plans have therefore been offered for exposing social service
providers to market pressures.
Under the most familiar proposal, needy clients are given vouchers that
can be used to purchase the services of any qualified supplier. Vouchers,
however, will assure efficiently provided, high-quality services only if benefi-
ciaries or their guardians are able to make informed decisions about quality.
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Richard Murnane, Richard Nelson, Arthur Snow, and Burton Weisbrod made helpful comments
on an earlier draft.
**Professor of Law and Political Economy, Columbia University. B.A. 1964, Wellesley
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1. See, e.g., National Academy of Public Administration, Reorganization in Florida: How is
Service Integration Working? (1977) (analysis of recent reorganization of social services in
Florida); M. Aiken, R. Dewar, N. DiTomaso, J. Hage & G. Zeitz, Coordinating Human Services
(1975) (five case studies of attempts to coordinate services for the mentally retarded); see also
Weiss, Substance vs. Symbol in Administrative Reform: The Case of Human Services Coordina-
tion, 7 Pol'y Analysis 21 (1981) (critique of attempts to avoid duplication in social service).
2. For example, monitoring of day care by public funding sources appears to be inadequate.
See Jackson, The Present System of Publicly Supported Daycare, in Public Policy for Day Care
of Young Children 21, 35-40 (1973). Furthermore, in most communities the United Way, a
private funding source, does not effectively evaluate service quality. Rose-Ackerman, United
Charities: An Economic Analysis, 28 Pub. Pol'y 323 (1980).
3. For example, one experiment with education vouchers, discussed infra note 24, placed
parents on a school-district-wide advisory committee. Parents "tended to be absent, poorly
informed, and deferential to the professionals" on the committee. Cohen & Farrar, Power to the
Parents? The Story of Education Vouchers, 48 Pub. Interest 72, 88 (1977). But see Dimieri &
Weiner, The Public Interest and Governing Boards of Nonprofit Health Care Institutions, 34
Vand. L. Rev. 1029 (1981) (recommending more client involvement on governing boards).
4. See, e.g., Nelson & Krashinsky, Two Major Issues of Public Policy: Public Subsidy and
Organization of Supply, in Public Policy for Day Care of Young Children 47 (1973).
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COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW
Yet even when vouchers are not feasible, alternative techniques may preserve
some of the benefits of market discipline. This Article considers one such
method, called "proxy shopping," which makes use of the market choices of
unsubsidized clients to assure high quality for the needy. Under the system,
funding agencies reimburse suppliers directly for services delivered to the
needy. The rate of reimbursement is equal to the amount paid by unsubsidized
customers for the same services. This method is particularly well suited to
situations in which vouchers are ineffective because program beneficiaries are
poorly informed or immobile, or because the choices of their legal guardians
are thought to be unreliable.
Although Clark Havighurst outlined a proxy shopping proposal thirteen
years ago,5 it has had little impact on the policy debate. This is perhaps
because Havighurst did not develop the idea carefully and because he applied
it to a service, medical care, where it can be of only limited usefulness. In this
Article, I present a model of a social services market that can be used both to
identify more precisely the strengths and weaknesses of proxy shopping and to
examine the desirability of using proxy shopping to finance several particular
social services. I hope to demonstrate that proxy shopping should be given
serious consideration as a quality-control device by government agencies and
by private charitable organizations that provide subsidy funds to a range of
nonprofit, for-profit and government suppliers of social services.
Part I of this Article analyzes the limitations of voucher plans. Part II
presents a model in which vouchers are ineffective while a proxy shopping
plan can serve quality-control goals. Part III compares the effectiveness of
vouchers and proxy shopping in controlling costs. Part IV discusses the
strengths and weaknesses of using paying customers to monitor quality in
three contexts: care of the "deinstitutionalized" mentally retarded, health
maintenance organizations and nursing homes, and integrated schooling. The
Article concludes that proxy shopping can be helpful in monitoring commu-
nity-based care for the retarded and can provide limited but valuable assist-
ance in health care. In education, however, where integration by race and class
is an important goal, the mobility of the wealthy can make it harder, rather
than easier, for the poor to obtain high quality services.
I. PROVIDING HIGH QUALITY SOCIAL SERVICES:
THE LIMITS OF VOUCHERS
Voucher plans are the most widely discussed method for introducing
market pressures into the provision of social services. The beneficiaries of a
voucher plan are given "tickets," which can only be used to purchase speci-
5. Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Market for Health Services, 35
Law & Contemp. Probs. 716 (1970). A similar reimbursement system was also proposed in R.
Andreano & J. Nyman, A Modest Proposal for Paying Nursing Homes under the Medicaid
Program (1982) (University of Wisconsin-Madison Health Economics Research Center Research
Reports Series), and further developed in J. Nyman, Nursing Home Reimbursement for Medicaid
Patients: The Case for a Market Based System (1982) (unpublished manuscript).
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fied goods or services, such as food, housing, or education, but which can be
used at any qualified supplier chosen by the beneficiaries. Suppliers then
redeem the vouchers for cash from the funding agency.
Under a voucher plan, at least in principle, suppliers face the same
market pressures in serving subsidized customers as they do in serving unsub-
sidized ones. A subsidized customer who is dissatisfied with the price-quality
combinations offered by a supplier is free to search for another who can
provide higher quality goods or lower prices. This creates competition among
suppliers and should result in a market where the various quality levels that
customers demand are sold for the lowest price that will cover suppliers'
marginal costs.
The assumptions that underlie a pure voucher program-that is, one with
no supplementary regulation-are based on a curious mixture of free choice
and paternalism. On the one hand, vouchers can only be spent on particular
goods or services that reflect the wishes of those who fund the program.6
Thus, the funding agency does not leave beneficiaries entirely free to make
choices according to their own preferences. On the other hand, since benefi-
ciaries are allowed to choose their own suppliers, the funding agency must
assume that beneficiaries are capable of making rational tradeoffs between
quality and quantity, that they are effective judges of quality, and that they
have access to adequate sources of supply. Absent the subsidy, they would
consume less of the service, but this consumption pattern would not arise
from a lack of information or of viable alternatives but from a simple lack of
resources.
Vouchers are currently used in programs that subsidize foodJ housing8
and medical care,9 and many commentators have advocated extending the use
of vouchers to other social services such as education. 10 Most of the current
and proposed programs, however, impose supplementary quality-control reg-
ulations, thus diluting the effect of market decisions by the beneficiary on the
quality of the service. Of the few pure voucher programs that do exist, only
one, food stamps," exclusively aids the needy. The Department of Agricul-
ture, which administers the food stamp program, does not impose special
6. In general, a funding agency might have any one of three attitudes towards the beneficia-
ries of the services it provides. (a) The beneficiaries' utility levels enter the donors' utility
functions directly. The funding agency does not care what beneficiaries do with their subsidy
payments as long as they feel better off. (b) The funding agency is indifferent to beneficiaries'
own expressions of preference. Instead, the agency benefits from knowing that beneficiaries are
consuming particular goods and services. See D. Collard, Altruism and Economy: A Study in
Non-Selfish Economics 7-8 (1978) (distiguishing between "utility-related" and "commodity-
related" interdependence). (c) The final situation is a mixed case in which both the beneficiaries'
consumption of particular services and their evaluation of this service enter the funding agency's
utility function. Advocates of voucher plans have either type (b) or type (c) preferences.
7. See infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
11. Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2029 (Supp. V 1981).
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quality-control regulations on suppliers that accept food stamps12 and does
not try to control the diets of beneficiaries.1 3 Unlike the food stamp program,
the other pure voucher programs are not designed exclusively to aid the poor.
They are administered through the federal income tax system, and thus pro-
vide no benefits to people too poor to pay taxes. Indeed, these programs
generally are not even characterized as voucher plans. Nevertheless, deduc-
tions and tax credits for such services as child care, medical treatment, legal
fees and housing are essentially voucher plans which lower the costs of certain
services and impose few restrictions on consumers' choices of suppliers. 14
12. Since 1977, the food stamp program has given eligible households fixed-sum vouchers
that must be spent on food. Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Food Stamp
SSI/Elderly Cashout Demonstration Evaluation 70-72 (1982). Certain kinds of food-e.g., liq-
uor, and most hot foods-cannot be purchased with food stamps, 7 U.S.C. § 2012 (g) (1982), but
otherwise beneficiaries can purchase anything they want, and neither stores nor the needy are
required to report on the foods purchased with food stamps. For descriptions of the food stamp
program, see K. Clarkson, Food Stamps and Nutrition (1975); M. MacDonald, Food, Stamps,
and Income Maintenance (1977). Real outlays on the food stamp program have fallen during the
Reagan administration, but the basic nature of the program has remained unchanged. Aaron,
Nondefense Programs, in Setting National Priorities: The 1983 Budget 101, 108-09 (J. Pechman
ed. 1982).
13. Nevertheless the quality of food consumed appears to be adequate. A study of food
buying habits concluded that both recipients of food stamps and eligible low-income people not in
the program used food "sufficient, on the average, to provide the 1974 Recommended Dietary
Allowances (RDA) for food energy and 11 nutrients studied. Averages for participants were
higher in most nutrients than for nonparticipants." Science and Educ. Admin., U.S. Dep't of
Agriculture, Food Consumption and Dietary Levels of Low-Income Households, Nov. 1977-
Mar. 1978, at 2, 24, 32 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Science and Educ. Admin.]. In terms of
nutrients per dollar, participants were just about as efficient purchasers as low-income non-
participants. Id. at 21. However, on the average low-income individuals consume more nutrients
per dollar of food purchased than those with higher incomes. Science and Educ. Admin., U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture, Money Value of Food Used by Households in the United States, Spring
1977, at 12 (1979).
14. These tax-expenditure programs fall into two classes. First, some programs directly lower
individual tax bills. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 44A (Supp. V 1981) (tax credits for child care); I.R.C. §
44C (Supp. V 1981) (tax credits for energy conservation investments); I.R.C. § 163 (1976)
(deductibility of mortgage interest payments); I.R.C. § 170, 642(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
(deductibility of charitable contributions); I.R.C. § 213 (1976) (deductibility of medical expenses);
see also Staff of Senate Comm. on the Budget, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Tax Expenditures 55-62,
135-42, 217-24, 237-38 (Comm. Print 1982) (describing the programs and estimating lost taxes)
[hereinafter cited as Tax Expenditures]; id. at 305-08 app. A (giving distribution of these and
other tax expenditure programs by income class).
Although the Tax Code only permits the deduction of gifts to certain types of charitable
organizations, I.R.C. § 170(c) (1976), and the I.R.S. may audit taxpayers with large deductions,
Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Internal Revenue Manual § 4015.7; Premis,
The Audit Review Process, 11 Creighton L. Rev. 755 (1978), these restrictions are primarily
intended to prevent and uncover fraud and are not aimed at ensuring service quality. Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.44A, 1.163, 1.170, 1.642(c), 1.213 (1979). One restriction on deductibility may be motivated
in part by a desire to regulate service quality: most child care outside the home must be provided
in day care centers licensed by the state. I.R.C. § 44A(c)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1981). It remains to be
seen, however, whether the IRS will vigorously enforce the provision in light of its primary
concern with tax evasion.
A second kind of tax expenditure benefit is illustrated by laws which permit employees to
exclude from their income the value of certain services, e.g., life insurance, I.R.C. § 79 (1976),
medical, I.R.C. § 106 (1976), and legal services, I.R.C. §§ 120, 501(c)(20) (1976 & Supp. V 1981),
education, I.R.C. § 127 (Supp. V 1981), and child care, provided by their employer, I.R.C. § 129
(Supp. V 1981). The day care provisions specifically permit employers either to provide the
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Except for "tax expenditures" and food stamps, other voucher programs
and proposals do not rely solely on market incentives to regulate quality.
Instead, they impose direct regulations that reflect policymakers' concerns
about both suppliers' monopoly power and beneficiaries' limited information
and scarce "shopping time". 15 Proposed housing voucher plans, for example,
generally include a requirement that housing meet specified quality stan-
dards,' and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
imposed quality requirements in its housing voucher experiments. 7 Under
section 8 of the Housing Act, the HUD program that most closely approxi-
mates a voucher scheme, 8 even greater constraints are placed on beneficiaries.
To qualify for a section 8 subsidy, housing units must not only meet quality
standards imposed by HUD and local public housing authorities, 9 but they
must be leased at a rent below a specified maximum level.2 0 Thus, section 8
services "in-house" or to give their employees vouchers to purchase the service in the market,
I.R.C. § 129 (Supp. V 1981). See also Zeitlin & Campbell, Availability of Child Care for Low-
Income Families: Strategies to Address the Impact of the Economic Reconciliation Act of 1981
and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, 16 Clearinghouse Rev. 285, note 97 (1982).
As in the case of deductions, IRS scrutinizes exclusions for fraud, not quality, and a check of
recent IRS Revenue Rulings showed no disputes under these sections. Treas. Reg. § 1.79,
proposed § 1.120, proposed § 1.127, § 1.129.
15. See, e.g., Bridge, Information Imperfections: The Achilles' Heel of Entitlement Plans,
86 Sch. Rev. 504 (1978). The author argues that
[w]e must face the fact that various target groups differ in their information-seeking
habits and information-processing abilities, and [that] ... low-income, less educated
individuals . .. are exactly the ones who are least likely to seek and process the
information they need to make intelligent choices. Forty years of social research have
consistently found a positive correlation between information levels and social class, and
this is true for a wide range of subjects including child rearing practices, education,
nutrition and general information.
Id. at 512 (citations omitted).
16. De Leeuw, Leaman & Blank, The Design of a Housing Allowance (Urban Institute
1970), reprinted in Economic Foundations of Property Law 218 (B. Ackerman ed. 1975), analyzes
four kinds of voucher plans which differ in the amount of direct quality control.
17. The results of the experiments are summarized in Congressional Budget Office, U.S.
Congress, Federal Housing Assistance: Alternative Approaches 43-50 (1982); Khadduri & Struyk,
Housing Vouchers for the Poor, I J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 196 (1982); Struyk, Tuccillo & Zais,
Housing and Community Development, in The Reagan Experiment 393, 408-10 (1982).
18. United States Housing Act of 1937, § 8, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1976). For an evaluation of
§ 8 as originally constituted, see Olsen & Rasmussen, Section 8 Existing: A Program Evaluation, 6
Occasional Papers in Housing & Community Aff. 1 (1979).
19. The Act requires substantial rehabilitation of existing housing. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a)
(1976). HUD has set minimum housing quality standards and in 1980 they elaborated these
general standards with a detailed training manual. 24 C.F.R. § 882.109 (1982) U.S. Dep't Housing
and Urban Development, Inspection Form: Section 8 Existing Housing Program (1980) (OMB
No. 063-R1684). Local Public Housing authorities can, with HUD approval, add more stringent
requirements, and about one-third have done so. These additional quality standards often reflect
local housing codes which are, in principle, applicable to all housing. Interview with Jennifer
Stucker, Social Science Analyst, Policy Development and Research, HUD. In fact, the § 8
requirements are more stringent than those applied to the market as a whole because a unit cannot
be included in the program unless it has passed an inspection. In the private market, in contrast,
housing can be rented without a prior inspection by housing code authorities, and many com-
munities do not even have a code for existing housing.
20. § 8(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(1) (1976).
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not only regulates housing quality, but also limits the right of beneficiaries to
decide how much of their income will be allocated to housing. The Reagan
Administration has proposed making section 8 more like a pure housing
voucher program by removing the rent ceilings, but the basic minimum quality
standards would remain unchanged. 2' Thus even as it moves to a greater
reliance on market tests, the Administration has retained direct controls and
appears unwilling to rely on the choices of beneficiaries.
Medicare and Medicaid are both similar to open-ended voucher programs
since beneficiaries are generally able to choose which doctors and hospitals to
use and since few overall limits are placed on spending.2 2 Nevertheless, the
government sets the basic terms of the subsidized insurance contract and
regulates rates. 23
Similarly, most advocates of vouchers in education do not favor a pro-
gram which gives parents complete freedom of choice. Systems typically limit
segregation by race and class, control some curricular and personnel deci-
21. The proposed revisions would also increase the incentive to shop for housing that
qualifies for the subsidy. At the same time, however, benefit levels would be cut substantially so
that the overall incentive to participate would be much lower than at present. See Aaron, supra
note 12, at 121-24; Struyck, Tuccillo & Zais, supra note 17, at 408-10.
22. The relevant statute is the Social Security Amendments of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395, 1396
(1976). For additional information on Medicaid, see Feder, Holahan, Bovbjerg & Hadley, Health
in The Reagan Experiment 271 (1982) (overview of Medicare and Medicaid) [hereinafter cited as
Healthl; Congressional Budget Office, Medicaid: Choices for 1982 and Beyond (1981).
23. Prices are regulated by the government, and not all services are covered. Doctors and
hospitals can refuse to take Medicaid and Medicare patients if they believe the reimbursement
rates are too low. Health, supra note 22, at 300, claims that "Medicare and Medicaid ... pay
providers lower rates than the private sector does." According to the Congressional Budget
Office, supra note 22, "[t]he difference between Medicaid fees and Medicare fees for physicians'
services is substantial, and the difference between Medicaid fees and those charged private
patients is even greater." Under Medicare, "[p]hysicians are paid the lowest of their actual
charge, their average charge, or the 75th percentile of charges for the same procedure." Id. at 18-
19.
Recently the Reagan Administration and Congress have proposed a number of changes, some
of them designed to give beneficiaries an incentive to be more sensitive to costs. For Medicare,
Congress enacted an amendment that increased the cost-sharing requirements, and the Reagan
Administration has also proposed tightening the allowed charge for physicians' services. For
Medicaid, the administration has recommended cost sharing for the elderly and the disabled poor,
as well as a requirement that states impose general cost sharing. Health, supra note 22, at 286.
Given budget pressures, states themselves are reducing the coverage of optional services, restrict-
ing eligibility, and limiting the charges they will reimburse. Id. at 282-91. However, these
proposals may do little to enhance competition between suppliers or improve quality.
To increase competition, some experts have suggested "a shift from publicly run to publicly
financed insurance. Program participants would receive fixed-value vouchers to purchase insur-
ance in the private market. The initial value of these vouchers would be the cost of an average
beneficiary's medical care under the public system." See id. at 299; see also Congressional Budget
Office, U.S. Congress, Containing Medical Care Costs Through Market Forces 47-53 (1982).
Other analysts, however, believe that there is a tradeoff between controlling costs through
vouchers and assuring quality. An Urban Institute study argues that vouchers might produce
reductions rather than increases in quality, Health, supra note 22, at 300. Aaron, supra note 13, at
130, worries that if beneficiaries are "required to choose among alternative health insurance
plans, it would be necessary to decide what protection to give patients, particularly the elderly,
who may be too uninformed or bewildered to make sound judgments."
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sions, and limit parents' ability to supplement the voucher with their own
funds.2 14
The reluctance of policymakers to endorse a pure, unregulated voucher
plan reflects a pervasive difficulty. The premise underlying a pure voucher
plan is that informed market decisions by recipients of services will assure
optimal quality. Yet in many contexts such informed choice is unlikely or
impossible. This disadvantage is particularly acute when the beneficiaries are
very young, very old, sick or handicapped. 25 The efficacy of vouchers de-
signed to aid such needy people would depend entirely on the choices of those
who care for them. If many beneficiaries have no guardians, vouchers can be
of no use at all. Even if most dependent people do have parents or family
members who can be charged with spending the voucher, the funding agency
may believe that these people will not adequately represent the beneficiaries'
interests. For example, a pure voucher plan cannot assure high quality nursing
home care for senile old people if their relatives are not sufficiently concerned
24. Education vouchers were originally proposed by Milton Friedman in Capitalism and
Freedom 85-98 (1962). Since then, much has been written on vouchers by both economists and
educators. One analyst, after reviewing the history of education vouchers writes that "the actual
implementation of education vouchers will inevitably involve additional regulatory activities...
such as certifying schools and staff, overseeing the process of student selection by schools, and
designating voucher amounts for students with special needs." Salganik, The Fall and Rise of
Education Vouchers, 83 Tchrs. C. Rec. 263, 278 (1981). A plan recently proposed in California
would forbid additional regulation of private schools but permit the legislature to allocate
resources to encourage diversity and provide information, and it may require standardized testing
and minimum competency graduation requirements. Coons & Sugarman, Educational Tax
Credits versus School Vouchers: Comment on the California Tuition Tax Credit Proposal, in
Family Choice in Schooling 169 (M. Manley-Casimir ed. 1982). For the text of the proposed
amendment, see id. at 181. An experiment meant to test the efficacy of vouchers was carried out
by the Rand Corporation in Alum Rock, California. This impoverished school district was
induced to participate with promises of extra federal funds. Because it proved difficult to separate
the effect of vouchers from the effect of extra funds, because no private schools participated, and
because political pressures within the school district, especially from teachers, prevented the full
force of market pressures from operating, the experiment yielded few useful results. The experi-
ment is described in Rand Corp., A Public School Voucher Demonstration: The First Year at
Alum Rock (1974). The results are critically examined in Cohen & Farrar, supra note 3. Bridge,
supra note 15, shows that the poor information of parents limited the effectiveness of the program
and reports that the poorly educated were less well-informed than other groups of parents.
In spite of considerable criticism of voucher plans, and one discouraging experiment, educa-
tion vouchers are still a live issue. Two early supporters have proposed an amendment to the
California Constitution establishing a voucher system, Coons & Sugarman, supra, and a Reagan-
appointed panel on school financing endorsed vouchers in principle and recommended that
federal aid to disadvantaged school children be given, not to school districts, but to the children
themselves as vouchers or "tuition credits." These credits could be used in either public or private
schools. U.S. Advisory Panel on Financing Elementary and Secondary Education, Toward More
Local Control: Financial Reform for Public Education 5-6 (1982). A minority of the panel
objected to the voucher proposal because they believed that the parents of the intended beneficia-
ries would not make the best educational choices for their children and because the plan would
undermine public schools. Id. at 13-15.
25. Nevertheless, voucher plans have been proposed for programs that aid dependent people,
although most retain considerable direct regulation of quality and price. See, e.g., Nelson &
Krashinsky, supra note 4 (day care); B. Baker, G. Seltzer & M. Seltzer, As Close As Possible:
Community Residences for Retarded Adults (1974) (mental retardation); Pruger & Miller, Com-
petition and the Public Social Services, Pub. Welfare, Fall 1973, at 16. See generally Reid,
Reforming the Social Services Monopoly, Soc. Work, Nov. 1972, at 44.
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about the welfare of their elderly family members to investigate thoroughly
the quality of various nursing homes.
Supplementing a voucher plan with direct regulation of suppliers might
remedy the unwillingness or inability of guardians to make informed choices,
but the advantages of a voucher plan are obviously attenuated if vouchers
must be accompanied by direct controls on quality. Direct regulation of
quality is, moreover, often cumbersome and ineffective. It would be prefera-
ble to develop a plan that used market pressures for quality control but that
did not have the disadvantages of vouchers. In the next Part, I will show that
proxy shopping can be used under some conditions to assure high quality
without the need for direct regulation of quality. This system would be
especially useful in those situations in which vouchers are ineffective because
beneficiaries, for one reason or another, are incapable of making choices
among various suppliers.
II. USING PAYING CUSTOMERS To MONITOR QUALITY
THROUGH PROXY SHOPPING
In this Part, I present a stylized social service "market" in which proxy
shopping is a more effective quality-control mechanism than either vouchers
or direct regulation of quality. In this market, there are many suppliers of a
similiar service, but needy beneficiaries are each limited to a single supplier.
Age, sickness, disability or poverty restricts their mobility. 26 The funding
agency wishes to assure that the needy receive reasonably high-quality services
under a plan which pays suppliers the market price. Vouchers, however, are
useless as a quality-control method, since the needy are entirely immobile.
Moreover, I assume that direct regulation is not feasible because the funding
agency has difficulty both discovering suppliers' costs of production and
monitoring service quality.27 The same service is also demanded by unsubsi-
dized customers, however, who are mobile, well informed, and not economi-
cally disadvantaged. Thus, in the model developed here, the choices of paying
customers can be used to assure high quality for all through a proxy shopping
scheme.
The basic proxy shopping plan is simple. In contrast to a voucher pro-
gram, the funding agency reimburses the supplier directly for services ren-
26. In a few situations mobility is restricted by law. Thus, some public subsidies for day care
require recipients to send their children to specified centers. Jackson, supra note 2, at 21. For a
critique of this practice, see Nelson & Krashinsky, supra note 4 at 63-64.
27. Moreover, I assume that representatives of the funding source cannot monitor service
quality directly by becoming paying customers. Thus, this model is not applicable to most artistic
and cultural activities where donors are generally also paying customers. For an analysis of the
pricing practices of cultural institutions, see Hansmann, Non-Profit Enterprise in the Performing
Arts, 12 Bell J. Econ. 341 (1981).
The funding source, however, has no problem determining who is eligible for subsidy. See M.
Krashinsky, User Charges in the Social Services: An Economic Theory of Need and Ability,
(1981), for a discussion of the monitoring problems that arise when it is difficult to identify the
needy. Krashinsky argues that in-kind transfer programs may be preferable to monetary transfers
in this case even when donors only care about the utility levels of the needy.
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dered to subsidized customers. In order to receive reimbursement a supplier
must have a certain number of unsubsidized, paying customers. The funding
agency pays any supplier who meets this requirement an amount equal to the
price paid by unsubsidized customers multiplied by the number of subsidized
customers served by the supplier.
Although the basic mechanism of a proxy shopping plan is simple, the
desirability of such a plan depends on the presence of a detailed set of
conditions. In this Part, I first present a model of a social services market in
which these conditions are met so that a proxy shopping plan without any
supplementary regulations ensures that subsidized customers receive the same
level of quality as paying customers. I then go on to consider situations in
which a pure proxy shopping plan encounters difficulties that can be corrected
through modification in the scheme. Even when proxy shopping must be
supplemented with various regulations, it often will still be more effective than
a voucher system or a plan that controls quality entirely through direct
regulation.
A. The Basic Model
1. The Desirability of Using Paying Customers' Choices. Before imple-
menting a proxy shopping plan, a funding agency must determine that the
needy should receive the same quality levels as the unsubsidized. The agency
must therefore ask (1) whether paying customers themselves receive reasona-
bly high quality levels, and (2) whether the needy and the unsubsidized have
comparable tastes, so that the choices of paying customers are acceptable
surrogates for the choices the needy would make if they were capable of
shopping for themselves.
a. Competitive Markets. Deciding whether paying customers receive ade-
quate levels of quality is a relatively complex task, which is explored in greater
detail later.2 8 At a minimum, however, to assure reasonably high quality, the
market for the service must be relatively competitive. In other words, there
must be many suppliers of the service, each of whom competes for the
business of customers by trying to produce high quality for low prices. There-
fore, the model assumes that scale economies are small relative to the size of
the market so that paying customers have a real choice of providers. Although
a wide range of circumstances can produce diseconomies of scale, the dis-
economies in this market are assumed to result from the presence of conges-
tion, a circumstance that is particularly characteristic of social services and of
other goods that are consumed communally. Communal goods are those, such
as day care centers and movies, that can be consumed by several people
simultaneously, as opposed to private goods, such as ice cream, that can only
be consumed by a single individual. Congestion occurs because, after serving a
certain number of customers, a communally used facility becomes crowded,
28. See infra text accompanying notes 34-35.
1983] 1413
HeinOnline -- 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1413 1983
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
and quality can be maintained only by incurring additional costs. 29 Therefore,
it generally will be efficient for several suppliers to exist even if they all
provide the same quality of service.
In addition, the market functions smoothly because I assume that the
participants in it are rational maximizers. Paying customers seek to maximize
their utility subject to their budget constraints, while suppliers choose the
price-quality level that most benefits them: for-profit firms maximize profits;
nonprofit firms-both charities and government instrumentalities-maximize
revenues subject to a break-even constraint. Hence, producers have an incen-
tive to provide the price-quality combinations demanded by paying con-
sumers.
b. The Quality Index. By using a single index of quality for all cus-
tomers, the model assumes that both needy and paying customers assign the
same weights to various measures of service quality. To put it more formally,
the services provided by any supplier can be completely characterized by
specifying the level of the quality index, qi.3 Moreover, both needy and
paying customers value increments in the quality index, and there is no point
at which either group ceases to derive benefits from increases in quality. 3'
Normally, customers must choose not only the quality but also the quan-
tity of a service. A more general model would therefore permit paying and
subsidized customers to sacrifice quality for given increases in quantity. To
keep the discussion simple, however, the model assumes that all customers
consume the same quantity of the service, and that each person patronizes
only one supplier.
2. The Feasibility of Using Paying Customers' Choices. If the funding
agency concludes that the needy should obtain the same quality as that chosen
by paying customers, it must then consider whether proxy shopping is an
effective substitute for direct regulation of quality. The agency must therefore
ask (1) whether it is reasonable to expect paying and subsidized customers to
use the same suppliers, and (2) whether suppliers are likely to provide subsi-
dized customers assigned to them with the same level of quality they provide
to paying customers.
29. Congestion-prone goods are analyzed in Berglas & Pines, Clubs, Local Public Goods and
Transportation Models, 15 J. Pub. Econ. 141 (1981).
30. Essentially qi is a hedonic price index or weighted average of service characteristics. For
an analysis and critique of the theory underlying the use of hedonic indexes, see Rosen, Hedonic
Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition, 82 J. Pol. Econ. 34
(1974).
31. This nonsatiation assumption should be contrasted with an alternative specification in
which each person has a most preferred quality level. The suppliers' services would then be like
the color spectrum. Each person has a most preferred "color" that they would choose if the price
of colors were zero. The distinction between nonsatiation in quality and quality as "color" is
equivalent to the distinction made in industrial-organization literature between "quality disper-
sion" and "product variety" respectively. See Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Product Markets with
Imperfect Information, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers and Proc. 339, 342-43 (1979). In the "product
variety" case, the subsidized and the unsubsidized would have to have similar "favorite colors" in
order for a proxy shopping scheme to succeed.
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a. Nonsegregation of Customers. Three conditions must be met to ensure
that there are no obstacles to the use of the same suppliers by both needy and
paying customers. First, the model assumes that a substantial proportion of
paying customers do not care who else consumes the service along with them
and are therefore not reluctant to use suppliers that serve subsidized cus-
tomers. Second, suppliers are also assumed to be indifferent to the mix of
customers so long as the subsidy rate equals the market price. The needy are
assumed to be no more or less expensive to care for, on the average, than are
those who pay their own way. Third, the model assumes that the suppliers to
which paying customers have access include providers who realistically could
be used to provide services to the needy. This condition, which I call the
mixing-and-sorting condition, itself has two preconditions. First, since people
of similiar incomes tend to live near each other, transportation and search
costs must be low enough and homogeneous income clusters small enough to
permit paying customers to shop outside their immediate neighborhood.32
Second, scale economies, although small enough to ensure a competitive
market structure, must also be large enough to make it efficient for firms to
provide services to a substantial number of customers. For example, suppose
that babysitters provided the most economical form of full-time child care.
Individual sitters would not generally be able to care for the children of more
than one household, and proxy shopping could not be used.
b. The Nondiscrimination Condition. Proxy shopping will only succeed
if the quality of service a person obtains from a particular supplier is indepen-
dent of whether he or she is a paying customer. I refer to this as the nondis-
crimination condition. This condition is met if suppliers have either one of
two characteristics. First, the service may be organized so that everyone
consumes the service in common. Suppliers can exclude unsubsidized cus-
tomers who are unwilling to pay the entry fee, but once people are "inside the
door"-whether through subsidies or their own resources-everyone is
treated alike. Second, if the service is consumed individually rather than
communally, it must be provided by staff members who do not distinguish
between paying and subsidized customers. This could occur for any of three
reasons: Admissions may be separated from service provision so that the staff
is unable to identify paying customers; the staff may be trained in a profession
that teaches that equal care should be given to all clients; or the staff may be
reimbursed in a way that removes any incentive to discriminate between
clients.
B. Proxy Shopping in a Simple Market
1. Equilibrium with No Subsidized Customers. My discussion of equilib-
rium proceeds in two stages. First, I specify equilibrium conditions in a simple
market with no subsidized customers, and second, I introduce a subsidy
32. See Pack & Pack, Metropolitan Fragmentation and Suburban Homogeneity, 14 Urb.
Stud. 191 (1977) (documenting both the coexistence of average income difference across com-
munities and wide variation in incomes within communities).
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program. Suppose that all paying customers have equal incomes and tastes
and that all firms have identical production functions. In equilibrium all
paying customers must be equally well off. If one supplier provides higher
quality services than another, this is exactly balanced by a higher price. Thus,
all consumers are indifferent between suppliers. Since the market is competi-
tive, all producers set price equal to marginal cost. Any producer who tries to
charge a higher price loses all its customers. Let us assume further that the
firms' cost functions have a special form: the cost of producing increments in
quality is such that given identical consumers there is only one equilibrium
price-quality combination which maximizes profits or revenues. Many simple
production functions have this property, and the Appendix develops one
example where all firms just cover their costs in equilibrium.
2. Equilibrium with Proxy Shopping. Now suppose that each supplier i
serves wi needy clients. Suppose, moreover, that each supplier has a single
source of subsidy payments-e.g., the United Fund, a government agency, or
a single wealthy donor-that has the power to withhold funds from managers.
An effective subsidy strategy for the funding agency has two parts: the
conditions under which the agency provides funds, and the subsidy level it
provides to eligible firms. A proxy shopping plan would require each provider
i to serve at least one paying customer. If this condition is met, the funding
agency would then provide a subsidy of pi, times the number of needy clients
cared for by firm i, wi. Since only one pi, q1 combination maximizes the utility
of paying customers, the firm must choose this point if it is to serve any
paying customers. Therefore, the funding agency has succeeded in assuring
that both the subsidized and unsubsidized receive the same quality level. 33
Proxy shopping is a fully effective quality-control device under these condi-
tions, and no direct regulation is necessary.
The payment, piwi, is the only subsidy level which efficiently fulfills the
funding agency's quality-control goal. A lower rate would not permit suppli-
ers to break-even in competition with suppliers who serve fewer subsidized
customers. A higher rate also has little to recommend it as a subsidy strategy.
A higher subsidy rate would permit the firms to raise quality levels, lower
prices, and attract more paying customers. If the subsidy were proportional to
the number of needy clients, then providers with larger numbers of subsidized
customers would attract a larger number of paying customers. A funding
agency that wished to support the needy would pay the congestion costs of
increased numbers of customers, and paying customers would end up obtain-
ing part of the benefit of the subsidy. Instead of using paying customers to
assure high-quality care for the needy, the proxy shopping plan would subsi-
dize high-quality care for the wealthy. (A mathematical model, found in the
Appendix, develops these points more fully.)
33. Obviously, this payment scheme is only feasible if donated funds or tax revenues at least
equal the required subsidy payment. Thus, a more complete model would analyze tax or donation
decisions and consider their interaction with quality-control strategies.
[Vol. 83:14051416
HeinOnline -- 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1416 1983
PROXY SHOPPING
A proxy shopping plan in this simple market raises only one question of
fairness, and it can be dismissed quickly. Whatever quality level beneficiaries
receive, they may still complain that they "need" higher levels of quality.
Since needy beneficiaries, like paying customers, have utility functions with-
out satiation in quality, they will want as high a quality level as possible when
its price is zero. The failure to satisfy these demands, however, can hardly be
seen as a weakness of proxy shopping. The needy receive the same level of
quality as the unsubsidized, and no principle of equity would seem to demand
that society bear the cost of providing the needy with still higher-quality
services.
C. Variations in Price-Quality Combinations
In the preceding discussion I assumed that paying customers all had the
same income and utility functions and that producers all had the same produc-
tion functions. I assumed further that the form of the production function
implied that only one price-quality combination was produced. If, in contrast,
we assume that paying customers have a range of incomes and tastes, then
producers will offer a range of price-quality combinations, and a proxy
shopping scheme may suffer from two defects. First, it may fail to assure that
the needy receive adequate levels of quality-the quality of service obtained by
the lowest-income paying customers might be unacceptably low. Second, it
may be horizontally inequitable-not all needy people would be treated alike.
Suppose, first, that paying customers have a wide range of incomes.
Lower-income people, in general, choose lower-quality and lower-priced serv-
ices than do richer people, and the funding agency must ask if the lowest
quality produced by the market is acceptable for the needy. If the lowest
quality is unacceptable, this could be remedied by expanding the scope of the
program: the near-poor could receive vouchers which subsidized a percentage
of the price.
The remaining variance in quality levels may, however, continue to create
horizontal equity problems among the subsidized. Instead of treating the
needy equally, the plan would give them benefits that would depend upon the
particular suppliers to which they had access. The same problem might arise if
paying customers had different utility functions, or if firms produced a range
of price and quality combinations even when paying customers had identical
incomes and utility functions. The wider the range of price-quality combina-
tions provided to paying customers, the more unequally the needy are treated.
Under these conditions, a proxy shopping plan is most attractive for those
policymakers who wish to avoid subsidizing very low quality levels but are not
especially concerned with variations above some acceptable minimum.
3 4
Several methods could be used to correct this problem of horizontal
inequity. One approach would restrict the choices of paying customers: taxes
34. See, e.g., Fried, Is Liberty Possible?, 3 Tanner Lectures Hum. Values 89 (1982); Mi-
chelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7 (1969).
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or regulations might limit the range of quality levels available. If the funding
agency were a government with taxing power, it might be able to levy a sales
tax on the service tied to the paying customer's income. This would discourage
the purchase of luxury services. Obviously, such an equalizing strategy is
feasible only if the good is not transferable between customers. (See the
Appendix, Section B.) A regulation restricting the permissible range of quality
would provide an even more drastic solution to the horizontal equity problem.
There are, however, two ways to minimize horizontal inequity without in-
creasing the scope of the program or imposing uniform quality levels on
everyone. On the one hand, poor people assigned to luxury suppliers could be
required to pay something for the higher benefits they obtain. So long as
higher prices are, as I have assumed, associated with higher quality, charging
subsidized clients fees based both on their income and on the price of services
would further horizontal equity. 35 On the other hand, the needy could be
given cash benefits based inversely on their incomes and on the quality of
services they obtain.36 This, of course, would raise the costs of the program.
35. Hansen & Weisbrod, A New Approach to Higher Education Finance, in Financing
Higher Education: Alternatives for the Federal Government 117 (M. Orwig ed. 1971) propose a
sliding-fee schedule in a study of higher education. Federal grants to the states to provide social
services under title XX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1397 (1976), require that service
providers charge fees based on income. For example, a compilation of fee schedules used by
suppliers in the State of Connecticut is found in the Conn. Dep't of Hum. Resources, Compre-
hensive Title XX Social Services Program Plan for July 1, 1979-June 30, 1980, at app. D (1979).
36. Alternatively, funding agencies could require producers who accept a subsidy to show
that they are serving a mixture of different income levels. A producer might do this by tailoring
the price to the customer's income. A relatively low-quality supplier might charge the wealthy less
than the middle class. Such a pricing strategy might be required to induce the wealthy to put up
with relatively low-quality service. Similarly, relatively high-quality suppliers might charge the
rich more than the middle class in order to induce the middle-class to consume luxury services.
Such a constraint on supplier behavior could also limit the range of profitable quality levels. Since
this plan also requires price discrimination, however, it too depends upon the nontransferability
of the service. This possibility is illustrated below where yW andy m are the incomes of wealthy and
middle class families, respectively and U' and Un are representative indifference curves. Two
quality levels, high, H, and low, L, are provided. The prices or entry fees arep, p, p' and pM,
for each supplier and type of customer. In the diagram P, > 4H > / L > Pi"
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D. Regulation of Commercial Firms
In the basic model, the funding agency need not require all firms to serve
subsidized customers. The assumption that individual subsidized customers
are no more costly to serve than paying customers generally ensures that they
are just as attractive to suppliers. In addition, the model's nondiscrimination
condition implies that providers give comparable services to all customers.
In reality, neither of these conditions may hold in the absence of govern-
ment intervention. Thus, in many situations suppliers may be in a position to
discriminate against their immobile, subsidized clients, by charging them the
same price as unsubsidized customers while providing them with lower-quality
services. This discrimination may only be preventable by requiring that firms
adopt costly organizational reforms in order to receive a subsidy. Because of
the cost of such reforms, commercial firms 37 that refused to serve subsidized
customers would be able to supply high-quality services to paying customers
less expensively than would firms with a mixture of subsidized and unsubsi-
dized customers. Proxy shopping would thus become unworkable.
To be effective in the face of these difficulties, proxy shopping must be
combined with controls on commercial firms and a means must be found to
assure that these controls do not cause firms to refuse to serve the subsidized.
One solution is to permit firms to operate only if they adopt an organizational
form that prevents discrimination. If this organizational form can be adopted
more cheaply by firms with no subsidized clients, the commercial firms must
further be required to accept a share of the needy. Of course, regulations of
this kind, like direct regulation of quality, are not costless. Thus, such restric-
tions would not be efficient if the state could rely on the unregulated market
to control quality. These regulations are a second-best response to the prob-
lem of quality control.
E. The Requisite Number of Paying Customers: Ineffective Shoppers, Cor-
ruption, and Integration
The assumptions made so far ensure that if a supplier serves a single
unsubsidized customer, needy customers assigned to that supplier receive
adequate levels of quality.3 8 Under realistic conditions, however, eligible sup-
pliers should be required to serve more than one unsubsidized customer. Even
if paying customers are better shoppers than the needy, some of them may not
have the time or information to make fully adequate judgments about quality.
Requiring suppliers to serve more than one paying customer reduces the
likelihood that an especially ineffective paying customer is the only control on
the quality provided by a particular supplier. A related problem is the possibil-
ity of corruption through collusion between paying customers and managers.
37. These firms could be either for-profits or "commercial" nonprofits as defined by
Hansmann, The Role of Non-Profit Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J. 835, 840-41 (1980).
38. This assumes, of course, that the unsubsidized customer receives an adequate level of
quality.
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This problem will be discussed more fully in Part IV in connection with
medical care. In brief, it may be necessary to require the supplier to serve a
significant percentage of paying customers in order to reduce the risk that all
of a supplier's paying customers will be corruptible.
Finally, consider a situation, such as education, 9 in which the needy
benefit from integration with paying customers: The ratio of paying to non-
paying customers is itself a measure of service quality for the needy. If this is
the case, proxy shopping cannot by itself guarantee high quality, and the share
of paying customers in the total may need to be regulated directly.
III. CONTROLLING COSTS: A COMPARISON OF PROXY SHOPPING
AND VOUCHERS
Proxy shopping can be superior to a voucher plan when the needy are less
effective shoppers than are unsubsidized customers. Proxy shopping, unlike
vouchers, compensates for the inability of the needy to shop for quality.
Suppose, however, that the funding agency believes that the needy are as well-
informed and mobile as the rich, but that they ought to consume a higher
quality level than they would choose if given a pure income grant. The agency,
for example, might believe that the poor should consume more nutritious food
or better quality housing. The agency, however, not only wishes to encourage
the beneficiaries to consume higher quality levels of the good, but it would
also like to achieve this goal in the most cost-effective way. This Part com-
pares voucher programs, proxy shopping, and programs that combine the two
pure types to determine which is the most effective way to control quality.
Voucher programs can take several forms, but I consider the two most
basic and commonly proposed varieties: a voucher which pays a fixed sum and
one which finances a specified percentage of the price. Consider, first, a fixed-
sum voucher plan, where beneficiaries receive vouchers worth a set amount,
say Z dollars, which can be used only to purchase some good X. Thus, the
funding agency pays the entire cost up to a fixed ceiling, and beneficiaries pay
all costs above that level. Such a plan has little to recommend it as a means of
encouraging increased consumption of quality while controlling costs. If the
ceiling is exceeded, beneficiaries will consume the same level of quality as they
would if given a cash grant. 40 By hypothesis, though, the funding agency
39. See infra Part IV C.
40. To see this, consider the diagram below.
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wants them to consume a level of quality higher than this. If, on the other
hand, the ceiling is not exceeded, the needy exhaust the full value of the
voucher on the highest quality service available, even if increments in quality
are worth very little to them. 41 Thus, a fixed-sum voucher plan will either fail
to encourage the consumption of quality beyond that chosen with an income
grant, or it will be unnecessarily costly.
Second, suppose that the voucher is designed to reimburse the supplier
for a specified percentage of the price charged to the beneficiary. Beneficiaries
pay at least some of their own money for even the cheapest good, and have an
incentive to be cost conscious: if they choose more expensive goods, their own
contribution will rise. Although perhaps preferable to fixed-sum vouchers,
percentage-of-the-price vouchers are not clearly superior to proxy shopping
even when the needy are effective shoppers. In the Appendix, I show that in
order to make beneficiaries as well off as they would be under the comprehen-
sive subsidy given by a proxy shopping plan, the funding agency may have to
subsidize a very high percentage of the price. This could happen if the needy
have a very weak demand for quality. With proxy shopping, they receive a
fixed quality at no cost. With percentage-of-the-price vouchers they must pay
something for each increment in quality. If i s the proxy shopping level, and
if 3 is the share of the price paid by the needy, then the problem is to find a qf
•• A
such that the needy are indifferent between obtaining q for free and obtaining
qp at the subsidized price. Obviously, the needy now choose a quality level
above that chosen by paying customers (q, > q). Let p be the price of q and
pp be the higher price of q#. Then it is quite possible for p to be less than
(1 - 3) pO. In other words, the quality selected by the needy could require a
higher per capita subsidy than proxy shopping.
The recent escalation in medical-care costs and in spending for Medicare
and Medicaid-programs similar to open-ended percent-of-the-price vouch-
ers-appears to reflect exactly the problem described above.42 Several current
proposals to halt this escalation would continue to permit beneficiaries to
The income an individual has available for spending on other goods, y, is on the vertical axis and
the quality, q, of the fixed quantity of the subsidized good is on the horizontal axis. The
individual's preference function is represented by the indifference curves labelled uo, u1, u2 . With
no voucher plan, his total income isy, and, given the price of quality, his budget line extends from
y to qo. The individual chooses point A0 where his utility is maximized given his budget constraint.
With a fixed sum voucher worth Z dollars of quality, the budget line originates at B and extends
to qx, and the person chooses point A,. This is exactly what he would do, if instead, the program
provided a cash supplement of Z dollars.
Recent studies indicate that a high proportion of food stamp recipients spend more than their
food stamp allotment on food, so that the program essentially provides an income supplement.
Except for very large households with six or more people, at least 65% of recipient families spent
more than their food stamp allotment on food. See Science and Educ. Admin., supra note 13, at
15. Both Clarkson, supra note 12, and MacDonald, supra note 12, however, conclude that food
stamps lead to greater expenditures on food than an equivalent cash grant. Food and Nutrition
Service, supra note 12, at 70-96, confirms these findings for elderly recipients.
41. Thus in this case point A, in the diagram in note 40 above would fall into the unreachable
portion of the budget line between B and y + z. The individual would pick point B.
42. See Health, supra note 22, 273-76. The authors report that "Federal spending on
medical care rose twelvefold between 1965 and 1980... [and] health's share of private incomes
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choose the quality levels they consume but would reduce the share of costs
reimbursed by the government.43 The needy, though, may be better off under
a variant of the proxy shopping plan, which subsidizes all or a high percentage
of costs, but requires the needy to consume the same quality levels as paying
customers. As I show below,44 however, proxy shopping is not a panacea.
Some of the quality-control problems in medical care are too deepseated to be
solved by an increase in competitive pressures.
Vouchers and proxy shopping, however, need not be mutually exclusive.
For example, holders of food stamps-a pure voucher program45-purchase
their food in ordinary stores where most customers are unsubsidized. There
does not seem to be any tendency for sorting by subsidy status per se, and the
choices of unsubsidized customers help assure high-quality food for the
needy. Thus, a program might combine features of proxy shopping and
vouchers by providing vouchers that could only be honored by suppliers who
also serve paying customers. To limit the financial commitment of the funding
agency, the voucher could be of the fixed-sum variety. Although, as shown
above, a fixed-sum voucher plan is an ineffective mechanism for quality
control, 46 the proxy shopping aspect of the plan would remedy this deficiency.
A combined program may be a useful compromise when the needy are
fairly competent shoppers but the funding agency is concerned that some
beneficiaries lack the time, information and bargaining power to make in-
formed choices. If the poor are, in fact, good judges of quality, then they may
be required to consume lower quality services than under a pure voucher
system because their choice of suppliers has been circumscribed. But if they
are not, the proxy shopping feature of the plan-requiring suppliers who
honor vouchers to serve paying customers-will put a floor under quality.
The main difficulty with a plan that combines fixed-sum vouchers and
proxy shopping is determining the amount of the voucher. To encourage
efficient and informed shopping, the voucher amount should be set before
purchase decisions are made. If, by mistake, it is set substantially below the
prices charged paying customers, the program will break down-no suppliers
will be willing to provide services at the reimbursement rate offered by the
funding agency, and poor people are not likely to be willing to make up the
difference. Neither pure proxy shopping nor percentage-of-the-price vouchers
have this problem since the subsidy level will not be set until after market
rose by 23 percent, from 6 to 7.4 percent .... Medical price increases ... accounted for more
than half the spending increases between 1965 and 1980 and three-quarters of the increase between
1975 and 1980." Id. at 274. Of course, Medicaid and Medicare are not the only cause of price
increases. Private insurance combined with the exclusion from federal income tax of employer
payments to health insurance plans also played a role. Id. at 276. Medicare does include a
deductible payment for hospital care and nonhospital physician's care and imposes a limit on
covered hospital days. Id. at 283.
43. See supra note 23.
44. See infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
46. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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prices are determined. They have the opposite problem: the funding agency
may discover ex post that the program is more expensive than it expected.
IV. APPLICATIONS OF THE "PROXY SHOPPING" PROPOSAL
If a market provides adequate quality levels to paying customers, and if
the needy and the unsubsidized have comparable tastes, the funding agency
may well decide that its quality-control goals will be fulfilled if the needy
obtain the same quality as paying customers. As discussed more fully in Part
II, proxy shopping can be used to attain this goal if four conditions are met:
(1) a large proportion of paying customers are indifferent to consuming the
service alongside the subsidized; (2) suppliers are willing to accept subsidized
customers on the same financial terms as unsubsidized clients; (3) the market
allows the mixing of customers with different income levels (the mixing-and-
sorting condition); and (4) suppliers serve subsidized customers in a nondis-
criminatory manner (the nondiscrimination condition). If, in addition, paying
customers are mobile and subsidized customers are not, proxy shopping will
assure high quality while vouchers will not.
With these conditions in mind, this Part illustrates the strengths and
weaknesses of proxy shopping when compared with both vouchers and more
direct methods of regulation. I consider its application to three important
problems: the care of the deinstitutionalized mentally retarded, the provision
of subsidized health care, and the integration of classroom instruction by race
and class. None of these services satisfies all the assumptions of my model,
but deinstitutionalization comes the closest. In addition, my proposed system
can play a limited but useful role in controlling the quality of health care. It
will, however, be entirely unworkable in education if paying customers are
prejudiced and dislike integrated instruction.
A. Care of the Deinstitutionalized Mentally Retarded47
In recent years, a major change in the treatment of the mentally retarded
has occurred. Thousands of retarded children and adults have been released
from large state residential institutions and now live at home or in smaller
regional centers, group homes, and skilled nursing facilities. 48 During the day,
sheltered workshops, specialized day care centers, and regular public schools
provide programs. This deinstitutionalization movement has attracted many
47. I am grateful to Anita Miller for research assistance on this Section. For a fuller analysis
of policy problems in the field of mental retardation, see Rose-Ackerman, Mental Retardation
and Society: The Ethics and Politics of Normalization, 93 Ethics 81 (1982).
48. Lakin reports that the total number of people in public residential facilities for the
mentally retarded fell from 194,650 in 1967 to 139,432 in 1978. In 1967, 99 per 100,000 people in
the total population were in such institutions. By 1978, the number was 65 per 100,000. Lakin,
Demographic Studies of Residential Facilities for the Mentally Retarded: An Historical Review of
Methodologies & Findings, Project Report #3, Developmental Disabilities Project on Residential
Services and Community Adjustment, University of Minnesota (1979) (on file at the offices of the
Columbia Law Review).
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committed supporters among professionals who care for the retarded,49 and
has spread quickly, if unevenly, across the country. 0 The program obtained
political support as a result of highly publicized scandals involving the low
quality of care provided by some large institutions.5" Predictably, however,
quality-control problems are also arising in the newly decentralized systems.
State funding agencies are not adequately equipped to monitor suppliers, and
investigative journalists have uncovered poor conditions in group homes,
special schools, and sheltered workshops. 52 Clearly, direct monitoring and
inspection by the state are more costly and difficult when 100 small suppliers,
instead of two or three large ones, supply a highly differentiated service. It
seems worthwhile, then, to ask whether market mechanisms might be used to
help assure quality.
Since the retarded cannot be expected to judge quality by themselves, any
market-like scheme must rely on the parents and close relatives of the re-
tarded. Many retarded children and adults, however, have no families willing
to take this responsibility. A voucher plan obviously would be ineffective for
that group. Nevertheless, it may be possible to use proxy shopping to provide
market pressures for high-quality care since the conditions specified in the
basic model appear to be approximately satisfied. 53 It is especially important,
however, to be sure that the nondiscrimination condition is fulfilled. Favored
treatment of unsubsidized clients is less of a problem when services are
consumed in common by all clients. For example, discrimination is less likely
in a sheltered workshop, which gives retarded people experience in working
with others, in sharing equipment, and in being part of a cooperative activity.
49. Nirje, The Normalization Principle and Its Human Management Implications, il Presi-
dent's Comm'n on Mental Retardation, Changing Patterns in Residential Services for the Men-
tally Retarded 179 (1976); Wolfensberger, The Origin and Nature of Our Institutional Models, in
President's Comm'n on Mental Retardation, Changing Patterns in Residential Services for the
Mentally Retarded 59 (1976). See generally Balla, Butterfield, & Zigler, Effects of Institutionaliza-
tion on Retarded Children: A Longitudinal Cross-Institutional Investigation, 78 Am. J. Mental
Deficiency 530 (1974); Biklen, The Case for Deinstitutionalization, 10 Soc. Pol'y 48 (1979) (citing
a number of studies published in the 1950's and 1960's that advocated deinstitutionalization).
50. President's Comm'n on Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation Past and Present 204
(1977) (recording the percent change in number institutionalized by state between 1970 and 1975).
51. Biklen, supra note 49, at 49-50, reviews the history of public support for deinstitutionali-
zation of the retarded in the United States.
52. Both professional and popular criticism of current deinstitutionalization programs is
growing, with quality-control and monitoring difficulties a major concern. See, e.g., Edelson,
Deinstitutionalization: Avoiding Disaster, National Association of Superintendents of Public
Residential Facilities (1979) (unpublished manuscript); Etzioni, Deinstitutionalization ... A
Vastly Oversold Good Idea.. . , Colum., Spring 1978, at 14; Throne, Deinstitutionalization: Too
Wide a Swath, 17 Mental Retardation 171 (1979); Gettings, Tentative Outline of Discussion
Topics: NASMRPD White Paper on the Future of Residential Services for Mentally Retarded
Persons (1979) (unpublished manuscript) (emphasizing the problem of assessing services in a
decentralized system.)
53. Of course, before putting a plan into effect locally, policymakers would need to study the
market to be sure that a large number of suppliers do exist, that the mixing-and-sorting condition
is satisfied, and that wealthy parents are well-informed and careful shoppers.
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The nondiscrimination problem becomes more serious when services are pro-
vided to retarded clients individually. Then, the suppliers must be organized
so that the staff either does not know which clients receive subsidies or has no
incentive to treat clients differently. If it is impossible to organize the agency
in this way, the establishment of professional training programs that empha-
size equal treatment of clients regardless of wealth might accomplish the same
end.54 As argued earlier, these methods of providing individualized care must
be coupled with a policy that carefully regulates entry to prevent firms that
accept no subsidized clients from attracting all the paying customers. 55
Of course, many poor retarded people do have relatives to make choices
for them, and vouchers could be given to this group. Even in this case,
however, funding agencies may believe that the choices of paying customers
will more adequately protect the interests of the retarded than the choices of
relatives. There are two reasons for this belief. First, policymakers may
believe that poor parents are likely to have relatively little leisure time or
money available to investigate quality. The opportunity cost of shopping for
quality may be lower for paying customers than for needy clients.5 6 Second,
the funding agency may fear that some parents will sign up for the voucher
scheme even though they care very little about their retarded offspring. They
might then try to monetize the vouchers by turning them over to low-quality
suppliers in return for cash. In contrast, the parents of unsubsidized children,
who by definition are willing to pay some of their own income for care, must
have at least some minimal concern for their children's welfare. This is not to
say that poor people, in general, are less caring than wealthy people, but
rather that, with vouchers, it is impossible to sort out uncaring people ex ante.
If some of the retarded have relatives who are effective monitors while
others do not, then it may be possible to set up a fixed-sum voucher system
constrained by the requirement that a facility also serve a substantial number
54. Eliminating discrimination through training programs that emphasize equal treatment of
clients could be a mixed blessing. A study of 30 institutions caring for the retarded classified
certain practices as "institution-oriented" or "resident-oriented." McCormick, Balla, & Zigler,
Resident-Care Practices in Institutions for Retarded Persons: A Cross-Institutional, Cross-Cul-
tural Study, 80 Am. J. Mental Deficiency 1 (1975). Practices were labeled "institution-oriented"
if they treated all children identically in the sense of creating rigid routines and regimented
practices and providing little opportunity for self-expression and initiative. Id. at 4-5. Clearly,
uniformity of treatment is not always the most effective or humane institutional objective. The
difficulty, of course, is that if an institution becomes more "resident-oriented" without a corre-
sponding increase in personnel, the staff may concentrate on caring for the more "appealing"
children and for those whose parents are most likely to complain about poor treatment. There-
fore, the nondiscrimination condition may not be satisfied.
55. See supra Section II D. Of course, even the most well-informed parents will not be able
to find out everything they would like to know about alternative methods of care. Professional
opinion is divided and much research needs to be done. There does not, for example, appear to be
an adequate study of the impact of different kinds of community-based care. Cf. C. Wieck & R.
Bruininks, The Cost of Public and Community Residential Care for Mentally Retarded People in
the United States (1980).
56. This may be true in spite of the lower hourly wage of poor people. The value of an hour
spent monitoring will be low in dollar terms but high in utility terms since the hour must be
subtracted from work or from time available to take care of home and family.
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of paying customers. 57 Retarded clients without families would simply be
assigned to a supplier.
B. Health Care-HMO's and Nursing Homes
In the current debate over health policy, several commentators have
suggested using Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO's) to provide subsi-
dized care to needy people. 58 Recognizing that quality control could be a
problem in HMO's, Clark Havighurst 59 has proposed mixing subsidized and
unsubsidized patients together as a way of improving quality for the poor. He
recommends using the fees charged to unsubsidized patients as a guide to help
determine the government's subsidy rate and points out that this kind of
reimbursement scheme "makes each potential private subscriber a sort of
proxy who would 'shop' for health services not only for himself but also for
... [needy] clients." 60 Some of his ideas are reflected in the Health Mainte-
nance Organization Act of 1973, which attempts to promote the growth of
HMO's."' Regulations originally promulgated under the Act limited Medicaid
and Medicare beneficiaries to no more than fifty percent of the total enroll-
ment in a particular HMO.62 However, reimbursement rates appear to have
been set so that paying customers subsidize Medicaid and Medicare patients.0 3
Proxy shopping cannot work to assure high quality under such conditions.
The chief problem with Havighurst's proposal, however, is not that it has
been misapplied, but that he did not carefully consider the conditions neces-
sary for its success. He therefore has overstated the potential benefits of proxy
shopping in this context. While the scheme has merit in controlling some
aspects of health care quality, its value should not be exaggerated.
Havighurst's analysis has three weaknesses. First, although he recognizes
that an HMO should not be permitted to establish a ghetto branch and a
suburban branch,6 4 Havighurst appears to believe that each individual HMO
office will, without any direct regulation, provide the same quality of service
to all patients. He fails to recognize that satisfaction of the nondiscrimination
57. For an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of such a system see supra Part Il1.
58. See, e.g., Health Maintenance Organizations, Parts 1-4: Hearings on H.R. 5615 and
H.R. 11728 Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and Environment of the Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). Note especially the testimony of Walter
McClure, id. at 464-89, Clifton Cole, id. at 1428-33, and Joseph Dorsey, id. at 1418-28.
59. See Havighurst, supra note 5.
60. Id. at 730.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1976). See generally Stern, Health Care Expansion: Provisions of the
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 8 Clearinghouse Rev. 89 (1974); Schneider &
Stern, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Poor: Problems and Prospects, 70 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 90 (1975).
62. 39 Fed. Reg. 37,316 (1974); see also Schneider & Stern, supra note 61, at 106.
63. According to Schneider & Stern, supra note 61, at 110, "HMO's are under no obligation,
and may well have no particular incentive, to seek to enroll [Medicaid and Medicare enrollees]
.... " Enrollees may have high expected health costs which are not reflected in government
reimbursement formulas. The authors thus go on to argue that the dual track system of health
care will be unchanged by the Act. Id. at 98-99.
64. Havighurst, supra note 5, at 731 n.48.
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condition is essential to the success of proxy shopping and that, absent
regulation, discrimination between subsidized and paying customers is likely.
Since most health care is inevitably individualized, the nondiscrimination
condition will not automatically be satisfied. There is no analog to the class-
room or the sheltered workshop. Therefore, organizational reform must ac-
company any move to proxy shopping. HMO regulations must make sure that
the staff either does not know which patients are subsidized or has no incen-
tive to discriminate. To ensure a mix of paying and nonpaying customers, the
plan must regulate or outlaw for-profit and commercial nonprofit HMO's
that serve only paying customers. This could be done, for example, by requir-
ing all HMO's to take a share of the subsidized population.6 5
Second, Havighurst does not explicitly discuss the possibility of corrup-
tion. Through collusion between suppliers and paying customers, the latter
might be nominally overcharged. Since the amount the funding agency pays
for each subsidized customer depends on the amount charged paying cus-
tomers, the supplier would illicitly profit from the nominal overcharge. He
would then kick back a portion of this amount to the paying customers who
collude in this scheme. Managers could also use kickbacks to compensate for
lower quality service, or secretly redesign the service to provide specialized
benefits to those who pay fees. 66 In fact, "paying customers" might not even
turn up for services. In this situation, the manager could either invent paying
customers by constructing fake patient records or else pay kickbacks larger
than the fee to induce people to register who receive no services. In order to
make these strategies both more costly for managers and more difficult to
conceal, the state could require that a significant fraction of clients be paying
customers. Havighurst does, in fact, recommend that at least one-half of each
HMO's patients be unsubsidized. 67 He does not explain why fifty percent is
better than one percent, but perhaps he implicitly recognizes the possiblity of
corruption and favored treatment.
Third, although Havighurst realizes that HMO's may have an incentive
to provide too little care in the face of patient ignorance, 6 he seems remark-
ably sanguine about the ability of patients-either paying or subsidized-to
judge quality. He defends his proposal by saying that it "would control costs
to the government not by introducing a cumbersome system of quality and
cost audits but by relying on the private consumer, who is still the most
sensitive indicator of relative values yet discovered. "69 Yet, it is a common-
place in medical economics to observe that neither paying customers nor their
65. The main difficulty here is the possible violation of the mixing-and-sorting condition,
discussed supra text accompanying note 32. Few HMO's may be established in low income
neighborhoods and those in more wealthy neighborhoods may be inconvenient for the poor to
use.
66. Cf. S. Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy, 85-108, 137-166(1978).
67. Havighurst, supra note 5, at 730.
68. Id. at 742-43.
69. Id. at 730.
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relatives are likely to be good judges of many dimensions of quality.70 The
demand for health care is determined in significant part by doctors rather than
patients, and widespread insurance coverage blunts the price consciousness of
consumers. Thus, relying on the market decisions of paying customers as the
central means of assuring high quality for the subsidized seems somewhat
unrealistic in the context of medical services.
In spite of these difficulties, patients can evaluate some aspects of health
care quality, such as the length of the wait in the HMO office, the length of
the appointment, the pleasantness of the doctors' personalities, the availabil-
ity of equipment, and the appearance of the offices and waiting rooms.
Unfortunately, none of these services is priced separately. Therefore, HMO's
might reduce the quality of other services in order to compete on the basis of
easily observable characteristics. However, even if patients cannot diagnose
their own ailments, an HMO's general reputation is likely to be fairly well-
known. Thus large-scale misrepresentations of this kind may be relatively
difficult to sustain. Furthermore, since paying customers are unlikely to pa-
tronize HMO's that score very badly on these characteristics, all HMO's
catering to this group must supply these services at fairly high levels of
quality. Only HMO's which face no market pressures can seriously skimp. Of
course, this list of observable characteristics does not by itself add up to high-
quality medical care, but it is one small but important part of the package of
services. So far as proxy shopping is concerned, however, only the last two
items on the list-equipment and appearance of facilities-are consumed
jointly by patients. Thus, the first three services could be provided in a
discriminatory way to the locked-in, subsidized patients. The length of a
paying customer's appointment may, for example, be a poor measure of the
appointments of subsidized patients.
Andreano and Nyman7l develop a similar proxy shopping proposal for
Medicaid reimbursement of nursing home care. They propose a sliding scale
under which payments increase with the proportion of paying customers a
nursing home can attract. They believe that their variant on the proxy shop-
ping plan will help assure the high quality, efficient operation of nursing
homes, but they recognize that the government may need to provide informa-
tion on homes to private customers and that it will have to regulate directly
those characteristics which are difficult for ordinary customers to observe or
evaluate.7 However, the authors ignore the possibility that nursing homes
may systematically discriminate against subsidized customers in some aspects
of care. As with Havighurst's model, direct regulation may be needed to
assure that the nondiscrimination condition is met. For example, devising
70. See, e.g., Bovbjerg, Competition vs. Regulation in Medical Care: An Overdrawn Dichot-
omy, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 965 (1981); Marmor, Boyer & Greenberg, Medical Care and Procompeti-
tive Reform, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 1003 (1981).
71. See Andreano & Nyman, supra note 5; Nyman, supra note 5.
72. Andreano & Nyman, supra note 5, at 18-19.
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payment mechanisms that would keep management and staff ignorant of
which customers are subsidized would help to accomplish this end.
In spite of these caveats, proxy shopping seems a potentially more effec-
tive quality control device for nursing homes than for HMO's because nursing
home care is subject to less professional control and requires less esoteric
scientific training. Most nursing home employees are not medical doctors, and
most of the services they provide are fairly easy for lay people to evaluate.
Thus, market decisions by paying customers can be used to help assure high
quality for the needy.
In contrast, only trained professionals can fully ascertain the quality of
medical care offered by HMO's. Despite this drawback, the use of proxy
shopping in HMO's merits continued consideration, especially in light of the
inadequacy of existing quality-control mechanisms. Expos6s of fraud and
poor care in some HMO's catering only to the poor7 3 show the need for very
basic quality checks. Although proxy shopping cannot, for example, assure
regulators that doctors perform only operations that are medically justified, it
can at least uncover the existence of under-staffed, under-equipped offices
located in out-of-the-way places and open only at inconvenient times. Proxy
shopping could then be combined with the current system in which beneficia-
ries can choose which HMO, doctor, or hospital to use. In situations where
fraud and incompetence are a problem, requiring HMO's to serve some
paying customers might be an effective way to remedy the worst abuses, even
if-for the reasons described above-it fails to equalize treatment for rich and
poor. In sum, though difficulties arising from the individualized nature of
health care and the ignorance of consumers limit the usefulness of "proxy
shopping" for HMO's, it may still be of significant value.
C. Integrated Schooling
For vouchers, the mobility of the consumer is an essential prerequisite to
ensuring the distribution of high quality social services. Absent mobility, the
consumer can make no meaningful, quality-based choices, and the system
does not effectively regulate quality. In contrast, under proxy shopping the
poor can be entirely immobile. Provided that the unsubsidized are mobile, the
nonpaying consumer will be assured high-quality service. In one class of cases,
however, the mobility of paying customers makes it harder to provide high-
quality services to the needy. Because education falls in this class, as this
73. Chavkin & Treseder, California's Prepaid Health Plan Program: Can the Patient be
Saved?, 28 Hastings L.J. 685 (1977); Schneider & Stern, supra note 61, at 130-34; see also
Mitchell & Cromwell, Large Medicaid Practices and Mediciad Mills, 244 J. A.M.A. 2433 (1980).
Mitchell and Cromwell provide statistics on physicians who care for large numbers of Medicaid
patients. They estimate that more than 30% of all Medicaid patients are cared for by physicians
whose practice includes at least 50% Medicaid patients. These doctors provide only slightly
shorter visits on average but they do tend to be older, to be trained in foreign medical schools, and
to have fewer credentials than other physicians. Id. at 2435.
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Section will argue, neither vouchers nor proxy shopping can be viable mecha-
nisms for regulating quality.
Suppose that all paying customers are prejudiced against the needy. In
that case, proxy shopping clearly will be completely ineffective, since no
supplier who serves subsidized customers will be able to attract any paying
customers. To see the problem, consider a variant on the basic proxy shopping
model. Under this educational system, parents pay for the education of their
children if their income is above a certain level. Many different schools are
available to these parents. The education of poor children is subsidized by the
state, and these children are assigned to particular schools. The school board
relies on the choices of the wealthy to assure high quality for the needy. A
school is only subsidized if some unsubsidized parents send their children to
that school. If, however, the wealthy prefer their children not to interact with
the poor, new schools will be founded which cater only to wealthy children.
The system will break down with the unsubsidized and subsidized clustering in
different schools. A voucher plan would not be any more effective. Clustering
by income level would still occur unless all schools were required to accept an
equal share of the needy, or the wealthy were compensated to accept integra-
tion.74
A more subtle problem may arise even if some paying customers are not
prejudiced and are willing to use the facilities to which the needy are assigned.
If the quality of classroom instruction is at issue, these few unprejudiced
paying customers might adequately control quality for the needy and a proxy
shopping plan might be completely effective. Suppose, however, that the
needy benefit from integration. Poor children, for example, might learn more
if put in classrooms with middle-class children. In these situations, the needy
will not obtain high-quality services unless a significant number of the privi-
leged are induced to participate. To ensure high quality for the needy, subsidy
payments must therefore be given only to suppliers who serve a relatively high
proportion of paying customers. However, the relatively small group of un-
prejudiced paying customers may not be sufficiently numerous to provide
adequate integration of service facilities. Again, neither vouchers nor proxy
shopping will be effective quality-control devices.
CONCLUSION
An antimarket ideology that seeks to purge social services of any link to
the price system for value received has frequently hampered the design of
mechanisms to assure high-quality social services. Richard Titmuss was proba-
bly the leading advocate of this antimarket view. In his famous study of
human blood, he concluded that a market in blood would produce lower-
quality supplies than a system based on gift-giving. 75 While his observations
74. For a series of closely related models, see T. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior
135-90 (1978).
75. R. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy (1971). He may,
however, have overstated the quality-control benefits of gift giving. For example, Kessel argues
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may be relevant when charities are concerned with the quality of donated
inputs, the main issue of quality control for most public welfare activities is
not the supplier's monitoring of donors, but the monitoring of the supplier by
private donors and public-funding agencies. Even if all inputs are donated, an
organization must combine them to produce services. Private donors and
public agencies may then have difficulty knowing whether the provider pro-
duces high-quality services. Given this difficulty, isolating social-service pro-
viders from market pressures can lead to low-quality, wasteful operation. My
analysis of the merits of proxy shopping thus contrasts sharply with Titmuss's
broad indictment of the use of market incentives to support altruistic public
welfare goals.
Any endorsement of proxy shopping must, however, be tempered by a
note of caution. In assessing the value of paying customers as monitors of
quality, policymakers must analyze each service on its own merits, contrasting
proxy shopping with a system of vouchers, with direct regulation, and with
various mixed policies. Several questions must be answered. Are the needy
poorly informed or limited to a few suppliers? If so, then vouchers are not
feasible and proxy shopping should be considered. Next, is it desirable to use
the choices of paying customers as proxies for the choices of the needy? Are
paying customers good judges of quality? Do they rank quality levels in the
same way as do the needy? Can the industry efficiently support enough
suppliers to assure that paying customers have adequate options? If these
questions are answered affirmatively, it may be desirable to use paying cus-
tomers to assure high quality services for all. Before proxy shopping can be
advocated, however, four further questions must be resolved. First, is a
substantial fraction of paying customers indifferent to the mix of rich and
poor? Second, can the service be organized so that the suppliers' staffs either
have no incentive to, or cannot, distinguish between paying customers and the
needy? Third, will new firms that serve only paying customers be permitted to
enter the sector? If they do enter, must they be regulated? Entry is desirable if
providers need not be organized to prevent special treatment of paying cuto-
mers. Otherwise, such firms must either be outlawed or regulated to prevent
"cream-skimming." Fourth, how will donors or government funding agencies
reward suppliers? If a supplier obtains funds from several sources, all of them
must act together.
The choice of proxy shopping as the most effective regulatory scheme
ultimately turns on these empirical issues as well as on judgments about the
effectiveness of vouchers and direct regulation. Although pure examples in
which proxy shopping is the only workable scheme are hard to locate, it is an
idea worth taking seriously given the difficulty of finding effective methods of
quality control. The widespread dissatisfaction with direct regulation, and the
quality-control potential of market pressures, therefore, suggest that a crea-
tive combination of vouchers, proxy shopping and direct regulation may, in
many cases, be the best regulatory alternative.
that a market system with liability imposed on blood banks would be most efficient. Kessel,
Transfused Blood, Serum Hepatitis, and the Coase Theorem, 17 J.L. & Econ. 265 (1974).
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APPENDIX
This Appendix presents a model designed to illustrate the results dis-
cussed in Parts II and III of the text. Using a simple production function for
quality, I show how a proxy shopping plan operates when the subsidy rate is
set equal to the price paid by unsubsidized customers. Next, I develop a
subsidy scheme that leads everyone to choose the same level of quality in spite
of income differences. Finally, I compare vouchers and proxy shopping.
A. Paying Customers and Quality Control
Suppose that there are two kinds of consumers of a product-needy,
subsidized consumers and paying customers. The quality of the product can
be measured by an index, q, such that all people value higher levels of q more
than lower levels. Quality is independent of the ratio of needy to paying
clients. Everyone who uses the product consumes one unit, and no one can
patronize more than one supplier. Paying customers all have the same in-
comes, Y, and the same tastes defined over quality levels, q, and spending on
other goods, y. Thus, they have,
U(q,y), Uq> 0, Uy> 0.
Let:
qi = quality level of supplier i, i- 1, ... m;
pi = price charged by supplier i for one unit of good of quality qi.
Then each paying customer chooses the supplier at which his or her utility is
maximized, subject to the condition that Y = pi + y. Given the assumed
uniformity of tastes and incomes, this implies that in equilibrium:
U(qi,y -pi) = U(qJ Y -pj), (1)
for all i and j which serve at least one paying customer. Thus if qi > qj, then
pi > pj. Furthermore,
U(qk,Y-Pk) < U(qy -p), (2)
for all k which serve no paying customers and all i which serve paying
customers.
Now suppose that each producer is assigned wi needy clients where wi >
0. Suppose that congestion exists so that for a given expenditure on other
inputs, quality is higher the fewer the customers who patronize i. Each firm
has an identical cost relationship,
C(qpni), with Cq > 0, Cn > 0, d(cq) 0,
dn
where ni = number of customers both subsidized and unsubsidized.
Suppliers are either charities or for-profit firms. For-profits maximize
profit, 7ri , charity managers maximize total budget, R, s.t. a break-even
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condition. Subsidies are provided by a single agency or coalition of agencies
which sets the pay-out rule, Si . Thus charity i maximizes
R i = Si + p1 ni- w) s.t. C(qini) <_ Ri,
and the for-profit maximizes
iri = Si + Pini - wi) - C(qini), s.t. ?ri _. 0.
This model is complicated by the possibility of congestion. Congestion
makes equilibrium conditions difficult to specify because the number of cus-
tomers affects the cost of producing quality.70 Thus, to make the analysis
tractable, I shall use a very simple form for the production function for
quality. Suppose that quality depends on the level of purchased inputs, bi and
on ni so that
qi = -"
ni
Thus, if purchased inputs double, qi doubles, but if both bi and ni increase by
the same proportion, quality is unchanged. Suppose that inputs are purchased
at a fixed price of one dollar per unit. Then, total cost is qini dollars and cost
per client is qi dollars. This form of production function for qi has the same
disadvantage as all constant returns to scale functions: the size of the firm is
indeterminate. A more complex analysis would introduce decreasing returns
to scale as a function of ni.
With no subsidized customers, nonprofits maximize pini subject to pini
qini, or Pi >- qi while for-profits maximize pini - qini s.t. pi >- qi. If one
producer sets pi > qi, any other producer can obtain all his customers by
offering a slightly higher qi (or lower pi). Thus, competition combined with




76. See Porter, The Economics of Congestion: A Geometric Review, 6 Pub. Fin. Q. 23
(1978).
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pi = qj for all i. The equilibrium level of pi = qi will be the one that
maximizes U(qi, y - pi). To illustrate this graphically, transform U to q, Pi
space, i.e. let V(qi, p) = U(qiy - pi). Then, in Figure A-1, pi = qj is the
"offer curve" of producers and point A is the equilibrium with no subsidized
customers and many suppliers (note that V3 > V2 > V'I). A critical feature of
this simplified model is that in equilibrium, all paying customers consume the
same price-quality combination. In a more general formation, some suppliers
might provide low q and low p combinations while others provided equally
attractive high q and high p combinations.
Now consider the following subsidy strategy. The donor requires each
charity or firm i to serve at least one paying customer, i.e. ni > wi, and
provides a subsidy of piwi if this condition is met. Given the break-even
condition, pi = qi, there is a single pi, qi combination that maximizes the
utility of paying customers. The supplier must choose this point if it is to serve
any paying customers.
B. Income Differences
The model can be extended to cover the case where paying customers
have a range of incomes but the same underlying tastes. Let r = 1, . . . t
represent the different income classes. The lower a person's income, Yr, the
lower is Yr - Pi for a given pi. Therefore, assuming a diminishing marginal
utility of income and of qualify, a poorer person values reductions in pi
relatively more than a wealthy person. This implies that in Pi, q space, the
indifference curves are "flatter," i.e. dpi/dqi is smaller, the lower a person's
income. Poorer people must receive relatively large quality increases in order
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representative indifference curves of people with three different income levels
where Ya < Yb < Y, At any point pi, qi,
aVa / 0 Va _ < b / a pb a IV a V
Oqi  OP Oqi Op Oqi / Opi
Given the charities' "offer curve" of Pi = qi, people maximize U(Yr -
pi, qi). This yields OU _OU
OYr - P1) Oqi
Suppose that this condition holds at Pa = qa for someone with income Ya .
Then, consider a person with Yb > Ya- Given the diminishing marginal utility
of income, this implies
OU aU
a Yb - Pa) Oq,
Since there is a diminishing marginal utility of qi also, person b maximizes
utility at a level of Pb = qb > Pa. Thus relatively poor people would choose
relatively low levels of Pi = qi, and the relatively rich would select a higher
Pi = q1.
If suppliers also serve subsidized, immobile clients and receive Pi for each
one, then a wide range of qi could be provided to the needy. If this variation is
believed to be undesirable and if the service cannot be transferred across
clients, then the variation in quality can be ended by subsidizing some mobile
customers and taxing more wealthy clients. If a single agency controls subsidy
funds for all charities, then "prices" net of subsidy or tax could be set so that
everyone ends up demanding the same quality level. The funding agency
announces that it will pay the manager of charity i:
t
E (1 - Br) Pinf"
r=1
where nr is the number of i's customers with income Yr, and the Br have been
set so that all mobile customers select the same quality level. The Br are
determined as follows, once the quality level, qb, has been set: Find Yb such
that when people with Yb maximize utility subject to pi = qi, they choose qb.
Set Bb = 1 for these people. Consider some Y, > Yb where
OU OU
aqb O(aCy- qb)
Set Bc > 1 such that
= Bc.
aqb O(y - Bcqb)
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Conversely, for Ya < Yb, Ba must be less than one (and greater than zero).
Each supplier also receives Pb (B = 0) for each immobile, needy client that it
must serve. In order to maximize profits or revenues, given the behavior of
competitors, each supplier charges mobile customers prices Brqb that depend
on their income and nets Pb per client. Thus, in Figure A-3, people with
income Yc > Yb pay Bcq b where B, > 1. People with income Ya < Yb pay Bq b
where Ba < 1. The prices have been set so everyone chooses qb.
C. Vouchers
Now consider a situation in which the needy can judge quality as well as
the unsubsidized. The subsidizing agency, however, believes that they should
consume a higher quality than they would be willing to purchase with an
untied cash grant. Given this condition we ask whether vouchers will be
superior to proxy shopping. To take a simple case, suppose that the needy
have the same utility functions as others but have lower incomes. Assume that
there are only two income classes, needy and wealthy with 5i and Yw respec-
tively so that Y, < Y,. First consider a voucher plan that reimburses all fees up
to a fixed ceiling, K. Equilibrium conditions for the needy are:
U(qi,. n) = U(qpyn ) = U(qm,Yn + K -Pm) (3)
if the needy patronize i, j and m and if Pi, pj <_ K while Pm > K. And,
U(qkY n + K -p k) < U(qi, ), (4)
where i is the th charity in (3) and k serves no subsidized clients. Since those
who serve subsidized clients will always charge at least K, the per capita
subsidy cost is K.
This scheme is illustrated in Figure A-4 for the case in which the needy
spend some of their own money on the service. A fixed subsidy can be
represented by the line q1 = Pi + K for pi _ 0. The minimum quality provided
1436 [Vol. 83:1405
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PROXY SHOPPING
"pi+ K = qi
FIGuRE A-4
is qmin" If the needy spend more than K on the service, a flat grant voucher is
cheaper than proxy shopping. Before espousing such a plan, however, it is
important to recognize that this result occurs because a fixed sum voucher is
exactly like an income grant if the person consumes more than qmin. But, by
hypothesis a cash grant is unacceptable to the funding agency. If, instead, the
needy's demand for quality is so low that they would buy less than qmin if
given an unconstrained cash grant of K, then the funding agency could
increase K until qrin = the quality level chosen by paying customers. The
needy would spend none of their own money on q and the program would cost
just as much as proxy shopping. It would, however, have none of proxy
shopping's quality-control benefits. Even if the needy are excellent judges of
quality, they have little incentive to shop effectively if the total cost of the
service is paid by outsiders. Therefore, a voucher plan of this kind is of no
particular value as a quality-control scheme.
Now consider a second type of plan that has a marginal effect on the
choices of all beneficiaries. Suppose that the value of the voucher is set equal
to (1 - u) of the market price. Then, since pi = qi in the uncontrolled market,
equilibrium conditions for the needy are:
(qi, y n - aqi) = U(qp,, - aqj), (5)
if the needy patronize both i and j while
U(qkn - aqk) < U(qi,jyn - aqi) (6)
for all k which serve no needy clients and all i which serve needy clients.
Clearly, an increase in the subsidy rate will induce the needy to choose higher
levels of quality. Such a program could be more expensive and yet give the
1983] 1437
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needy less income to spend on other goods than one in which the needy are
forced to consume the same quality as the wealthy. Furthermore, it will only
be fortuitous if suppliers end up serving both subsidized and unsubsidized
clients. For client mixing to occur the rate cz would have to be set so rich and
A.poor both choose q, i.e.:
A a-, A) A - A)
aq Y _q Tq (y - aq)
A subsidy rate (1 - a) can be found that will fulfill this condition, but it is not
obvious that it will also satisfy the funding agency's other subsidy goals. It is
also not clearly superior for people who oppose paternalistic interventions
because the subsidy rate has been set to produce a particular quality choice.
Figure A-5 illustrates this situation. The wealthy choose quality level q. When
the price facing the poor is ceqi, they will also choose quality q, but they are
obviously worse off than under a system of proxy shopping where q is
obtained for free. (Von < Vln ) .
If, however, the needy are believed to be mobile and good judges of
quality, then there is no reason to try to mix unsubsidized and subsidized
customers. The main issue is the level of the subsidy. With vouchers, the
utility level V1 obtained by proxy shopping in Figure A-5 can only be achieved
by a higher subsidy rate, 1 - f3. This implies a quality level above that chosen
by the unsubsidized and costing the funding agency (1 - O3)qp. Clearly it is
possible to have (1 - f3)qp > = /if the poor have relatively little interest in
quality. In that case, the percentage subsidy would have to be very deep in
order to induce them to purchase a quality level that makes them as well off as
with proxy shopping. Thus for a given subsidy budget, the needy may be
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